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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Juan Valadez-
Pacheco's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
The state accused Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of aiding and abetting German in kidnaping and 
robbing a man named Dave. See R. 66-67 (Change of Plea ("COP") Tr. p. 20, ln. 16 - p. 21, ln. 
6). According to the evidence presented at German's trial, Dave's girlfriend, Wendy, had used 
methamphetamine on a daily basis for several years. R. 34 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 296, In. 2 - p. 297, 
ln. 6). In 2008, German began fronting her methamphetamine and, by January 2009, she owed 
him approximately $2700. R. 32 (Jury Trial Tr. 273-76). 
The evening of February 4, 2009, Wendy was at her friend Christine's house with Dave 
where they had been smoking methamphetamine. R. 32 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 134, In. 6-22; p. 135, 
In. 22 - p. 136, ln. 20). German arrived at the residence with Mr. Valadez-Pacheco as a 
passenger and German went to the front door looking for Wendy. R. 17 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 135, 
In. 6-16; p. 285, In. 22 - p. 287, In. 3). 
Wendy, who was in a back bedroom getting high, asked Dave to tell German that she was 
not there. R. 19 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 163, In. 7-23; p. 285, In. 1-21). Dave went to the front door, 
stepped outside and told German that Wendy was injail. R. 18 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 139, In. 1-14). 
Dave came back inside, threw his beer can away and said he was taking off and Dave left with 
German. R. 18 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 139, In. 17-23; p. 287, In. 10-13). According to Dave's trial 
testimony, German would not accept Dave's indication that Wendy was not there and demanded 
that Dave leave with them while pulling a gun halfway out of his pocket. R. 20 (Jury Trial Tr. 
168, ln. 10-25). Dave testified at trial that he got into the back-seat and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco got 
in beside him and held a revolver at Dave's side. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 170, ln. 2 - p. 171, ln. 6). 
The police report reflects that Dave said that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was in the front seat. 
Dave testified that they drove to some grain silos. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 172, In. 14-18). 
German ordered Dave out of the vehicle with gun in hand, ordered him to put his hands on the 
hood and took all his possessions. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 172, In. 13-25; 173, ln. 2 - 174, ln. 25. 
While German took Dave's possessions, Mr. Valadez-Pacheo sat in the vehicle. R. 22 (Jury 
Trial p. 17 6, ln. 7-11 ). German told Dave to get back in and then they drove around until 
switching vehicles at a hotel. R. 22 (Jury Trial p. 176, ln. 5-25). German demanded to know 
where Wendy's van was and they drove to a pawn shop so German could verify the van was 
there. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 177, ln. 10 - p. 178, ln. 13). Dave testified that they drove to Jack in 
the Box and purchased food with Dave's money. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 178, ln. 24 - p. 179, ln. 15). 
Dave admitted on cross-examination that the drive thru at Jack in the Box was well-lit but he 
nonetheless made no attempt to escape. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 179, In. 22 - p. 180, In. 7; p. 198, ln. 
11 - p. 200, In. 1 ). 
Dave testified that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not speak English and did not speak. R. 20, 
23 (Jury Trial. p. 166, In. 19 - p. 167, In. 2; p. 178, 23-25). Thus, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not 
understand what was said between German and Dave. R. 8. Eventually, German was stopped for 
speeding. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 180, In. 23-25). While the officer was speaking with Dave outside 
the vehicle, Dave told the officer he was being held against his will. R. 24 (Jury Trial p. 182, In. 
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22 - p. 183, In. 15). Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and German were arrested and two firearms were 
found during the search of the vehicle. See R. 27 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 210, In. 24 - 212, In. 11). 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and German were charged with robbery and kidnaping in 
independent cases. R. 439-40. A jury found German guilty ofrobbery and kidnaping on 
September 10, 2009. R. 440. About a week after German's trial, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco pled 
guilty to an amended information alleging second degree kidnaping pursuant to a binding plea 
agreement. See R. 43-46. In exchange, the state dismissed the robbery charge and a separate 
case alleging trafficking in methamphetamine based on drugs found during an investigation 
following Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's arrest. R. 43, 122.1 The agreement provided that Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco would be sentenced to a unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of 
confinement of seven and a half years. R. 44. During the change of plea hearing, the following 
colloquy between the district court and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco occurred: 
District Court: Are you pleading guilty just to get it over with, even though 
you believe you are innocent? 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco: Um, I want to plead guilty because I want to be done with 
the case. And If I have to go to prison to pay for my crime, 
then so be it. 
R. 65 (Change of Plea (COP) Tr. p. 14, In. 16-20). Later, the district court inquired: "And why 
did you decide to plead guilty to the charge?" to which Mr. Valadez-Pacheco responded: 
"Because I feel like I've participated in taking my ... my friend." R. 65 (COP Tr. 16, In. 16-20). 
The district court inquired whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco believed the plea of guilty was in his 
1 According to the police reports attached to the PSI from Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's 
underlying criminal case, which was augmented into the appellate record on May 13, 2013, 
methamphetamine was found in the vehicle and in German's motel room. Those reports tend to 
illustrate that the state's ability to show that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco constructively possessed those 
drugs would have been questionable. 
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best interests to which he responded "Uh. it seems like it is." R. 66 (COP Tr. p. 17, ln. 6-8). 
The following exchange then occurred: 
District Court: Will you, then, tell me in your own words what you did to be guilty 
of this offense? 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:! pointed a gun to David Steward. 
District Court: And then did you take David Steward against his will 
somewhere? 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:All I did was point the gun at him. I. ... so he wouldn't 
move. That's it. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, the evidence essentially is that Mr Valadez-
Pacheco aided and abetted German Guadiana. Mr. Steward 
District Court: 
was removed from a residence, kept in a vehicle. The 
evidence would come out that Mr. Valadez-Pacheo held 
him in the vehicle so he couldn't leave the vehicle, and he 
was taken around Elmore County. 
Do you agree with that description of what occurred, Mr, 
Valadez-Pacheco? 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:Yes, sir. 
R. 66-67 (COP Tr. p. 20, ln. 16 - p. 21, ln. 6). 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco retracted his statement that he held a gun to 
Dave in the "Defendant's Version" of the offense portion of the Presentence Report ("PSI"). Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco explained as follows: 
We went to Christina's house. David came out. I was already in the car sitting in 
the back seat. Then David got into the car. He says that I pointed at him with a 
firearm. But that is not true and the guns did not have my finger prints on them. 
Then we went to Jack in the Box to buy food. Ifhe had been with us against his 
will why didn't he make signs or run that is why the prosecutor gave me the deal 
of that 7 1/2 in the prison and that is why I took it. Because my friend lost at trial 
and I am scared to go for many years at the prison for a crime I didn't commit. I 
want to know if they could be a little fair with me please for my mother who is 
very sick because she was in an accident and needs me to be in charge of her for 
the expenses of the house because my father died and I am the oldest. And also I 
don't know English to know what was happening that day. He was drugged and 
drunk. Thank you very much. 
PSI, p. 4. The pre-sentence investigator further indicated that: 
4 
Id. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco reports Mr. Guadiana and Mr. Steward talked, but he didn't 
know what it was about. Mr. Guadiana was looking for Wendy, but Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco claims he does not know why. He saw Mr. Steward exit the 
house holding a beer can and he says Mr. Steward had been using 
methamphetamine because "they all use drugs." 
Asked ifhe knew Mr. Guadiana had a gun, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco replies, "I had 
seen German had a gun." He denies seeing the gun the day of the instant offense. 
He also denies knowing there was a gun under his seat. He states his friend, Mr. 
Guadiana did not sell drugs. Looking back at his actions, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco 
writes, "I feel bad because I did not commit this crime that they accuse me of." 
He denies being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
At Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's sentencing hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
Prosecutor: One of the reasons why we set this matter over was the 
defendant's version in the PSI was considerably different 
than his allocution at entry of plea. And I haven't heard 
anything today to say whether he is sticking by his story in 
the PSI or is he going back to his version he gave the Court 
during allocution at entry of plea because he says he wasn't 
involved at all in the PSI. Yet, he told this Court under oath 
at his allocution that he in fact held the gun on David 
Stewart and helped in the kidnaping and robbery. So I guess 
I need to have that clarified prior to going forward today. 
District Court: All right. [Defense Counsel] 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco wishes to maintain his 
guilty plea. 
District Court: All right. And is that true, Mr. Valadez? 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco: Yes. 
District Court: Very well then, the Court will note that the defendant had 
changed his story at the allocution, entered his guilty plea 
based upon the statement of facts. And those statement of 
facts are what we are moving forward with. 
R. 62, 119 (Sentencing Tr., p. 4, In. 2-25). 
The district court followed the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to an 
unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of confinement of seven and half years. R. 
121 (Sentencing Tr., p. 9, In. 13-24). 
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Mr. Valadez-Pacheco thereafter pied guilty to illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1326(a) and (b)(2) based upon his removal from the United States on about September 1, 2005. 
R. 129-131. The United States District Court for the District ofldaho sentenced Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of thirty months concurrent with his 
sentence in Elmore County. R. 132. 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
On September 9, 2011, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco filed a prose petition for post-conviction 
relief. R. 3. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel's "indifferent advice" caused a 
manifest injustice upon the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea as he "would not have 
agreed to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" had counsel provided a copy of 
translated police reports, discovered the testimony of the state's key witnesses and advised him 
on the state's factual and legal burden. R. 4-5. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco attached excerpts from the 
transcript prepared from German's jury trial and related police reports, which illustrated that 
Dave's trial testimony differed from his initial report to police. The attached excerpts from the 
trial also illustrated serious issues regarding the credibility of the state's witnesses, including 
their long-term methamphetamine use, their motive to falsely implicate German in order to avoid 
the drug debt, the decision not to prosecute Wendy for delivery of methamphetamine in exchange 
for her testimony and the incredibility of Dave's story such as his failure to escape while at the 
drive thru. R. 5-11, 15-38, 40-41, 48-50, 52. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco also attached a forensic 
report indicating that the firearms found in German's vehicle did not have Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco's fingerprints on them. R. 48-50. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he "would have continued to assert his innocence and 
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demanded his right to a jury trial had he known, or been adequately advised of all the facts and 
the significance of the state's burden to prove their allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 10-
11. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco also alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. R. 
11-12. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco noted that he informed the pre-sentence investigator of his 
innocence prior to sentencing but the district court proceeded with sentencing based on the facts 
presented at the change of plea hearing. R. 12 
On March 12, 2012, appointed counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction 
relief, which expressly incorporated the claims raised in the initial petition as well as raising 
three additional claims. R. 89. First, the amended petition alleged that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco 
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to advise that he would be 
inadmissible to the United States and subject to substantial penalty upon re-entry under federal 
law as a result of his guilty plea to second degree kidnaping. R. 92. Second, the amended 
petition alleged Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was completely denied legal counsel at the change of plea 
and sentencing hearings due to trial counsel's insistence that he plead guilty notwithstanding his 
continuing assertions of innocence. R. 98. Third, the amended petition alleged that Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea was invalid because it was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 
R. 100. 
The state moved for summary dismissal. R. 373- 401. At the hearing on the state's 
motion, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco asked the district court to consider all the exhibits filed with the 
initial and amended petitions. The state indicated that it had no objection and the district court 
noted that it believed the exhibits were properly considered. Tr. p. 13, In. 12-17; p. 15, In. 22-23. 
However, in its memorandum opinion granting the state's motion for summary dismissal, the 
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district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not attest to his personal knowledge of the 
documents attached to the initial petition. R. 442. The district court thus concluded that it would 
only take judicial notice of the documents which it concluded were subject to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 201, including the excerpts from the transcript of German's jury trial and Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco's change of plea and sentencing hearings. R. 442. The district court further indicated 
that it had not considered certain attachments, including the police reports and the Idaho State 
Police fingerprint analysis report, because the copies were neither sworn nor certified copies, 
were not based upon Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's personal knowledge as required by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56, and contained inadmissible hearsay. R. 442-43. The district court then 
concluded that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco failed to present an issue of material fact on any of his 
claims and entered judgment on the state's behalf. R. 446-56, 458. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in declining to consider all the exhibits attached to Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco's initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-
conviction relief because he presented issues of material fact as to whether he was entitled to post-
conviction relief? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Declining to Consider the Police and 
Forensic Reports Attached to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's Initial and Amended Petitions 
for Post-Conviction Relief 
The district court declined to consider the police reports and ISP forensic report submitted 
in support Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-conviction relief, finding that the "affidavit 
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did not include sworn or certified copies nor state these documents were made based upon the 
Petitioner's personal knowledge as required in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56." R. 442. 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 720, 735 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1987); Paradis v. State, 110 
Idaho 534,536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Summary dismissal pursuant to LC.§ 19-4906(c) is 
the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 
67,266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 837, 907 P.2d 813, 
815 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Rule 56 provides that affidavits opposing summary judgment: 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). The admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) is a threshold question the trial 
court must analyze before applying the rules governing motions for summary judgment. Herrera 
v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,680,201 P.3d 647,653 (2009); Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 
P.3d 180, 182 (2003). This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
Here, at the hearing on the state's summary dismissal motion, the state affirmatively 
represented it had no objection to the exhibits at issue and the district court indicated it considered 
the exhibits properly considered. Further, the reports were clearly authentic and, thus, that the 
copies were not certified or specifically sworn to be true and correct in no way detracted from 
their reliability. Finally, the reports were admissible as public records and reports and to establish 
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that it would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to maintain his not guilty plea and take 
the matter to trial had counsel properly advised him of the state's evidence. Accordingly, the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the police and forensic reports.2 
1. Because the state affirmatively indicated it had no objection, this Court 
should affirm the district court's exclusion of the evidence at issue only if its 
consideration would have been plain error 
Our Supreme Court has held that while some form of objection is ordinarily necessary to 
preserve the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence under Rule 56( e ), neither a motion to 
strike nor an objection is required before trial court may exclude evidence offered by a party. 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994); Hecla Mining Co. v. 
Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992). However, in 
both Rhodehouse and Hecla, the opposing party had expressed some concern with the evidence at 
issue which arguably fell short of a proper objection pursuant to Rule 56(e). See Rhodehouse, 125 
Idaho at 211, 868 P.2d at 1227 (party only objected to the admissibility of affidavit under LC.§§ 
6-1012 and-1013 whereas the trial court excluded evidence based on Rule 56(e)); Hecla, 122 
Idaho at 782-83, 839 P.2d at 1196-97 (party objected to the consideration of some of the evidence 
2 The district court also refused to consider the audio recording of German's jury trial 
attached to the amended petition because it was not an official transcript within the meaning of 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 27(d). R. 442-42. Portions of the official transcript of 
German's trial were attached to the initial petition and, thus, post-conviction counsel and the 
district court must have known that such a transcript was available. It is unclear why counsel 
elected to submit the audio recording in lieu of the full transcript. It is also questionable whether 
the district court acted correctly in indicating it would accept all exhibits at the summary 
judgment hearing and then excluding the audio recording, at least without simply directing 
counsel to submit the full transcript. However, the issue is not raised on appeal because it 
appears that the excerpts attached to the initial petition contain the critical information and 
establish an issue of fact. The full transcript is obviously available and could be introduced in 
the evidentiary hearing on remand. 
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presented in affidavit but did not file a motion to strike). 
In contrast, here, the admissibility of the exhibits was discussed in open court, the district 
court expressed no concern with the form of the exhibits and the state expressly indicated it had 
no objection to the district court considering the exhibits at issue. At the hearing on the state's 
motion for summary dismissal, the district court inquired whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco wished 
the court to take "judicial notice" of any documents other than the various transcripts and 
documents from the criminal case that had been submitted by the parties. Tr. p. 12, In. 23-25. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco responded that the documents accompanying his petitions were properly 
considered. Id. at p. 13, In. 12-17. The district court responded that it considered the verified 
petition as part of the pleadings "but for the purposes of making it clear on the record for the 
appellate courts of exactly which exhibits I've considered for this purpose. I just want to make 
sure it's clear on the record what I am considering." Id. at p. 13, In. 24 - p. 14, In. 5. Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco then clarified that he was asking the district court to consider all the exhibits 
filed with the initial and amended petitions. The state indicated it had "no objection to the Court 
considering all the exhibits." Id. at 14, In. 22-23. The following exchange then occurred: 
District Court: Yeah. These actually were filed in the civil case. 
Prosecutor: Right. 
District Court: So I think the case that I cited in my scheduling order is that I can't 
go into the underlying criminal file and pull out things, but since 
these were filed as part of the pleadings in the civil case, I can 
consider them. 
Prosecutor: That's fine. That's just not the state was just using a modicum of 
caution. So that's why I sought judicial notice of the items that we 
specifically identified. I have no objection to the Court considering 
all the exhibits. Ifl was overly cautious, I guess that's okay. 
Id. at p. 15, In. 22-23 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, not only did the district court represent it could consider the exhibits, the state twice 
expressed it had no objection. These circumstances are distinguishable from those in Rhodehouse 
and Hecla where the party was alerted to issues with the evidence but the objection fell short of 
what would ordinarily be considered adequate to preserve an issue for appellate review. 
The Hecla Court also reasoned: 
As we have indicated above, some form of objection in the trial court is necessary 
to preserve the right to challenge on appeal the admission or consideration of 
evidence, unless the error is plain or fundamental. To this extent, we now restrict 
our review of the admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) more strictly than 
[it did in another case]. 
Hecla, 122 Idaho at 785, 839 P.2d at 1199. 
Had either the district court or the state expressed concern with the admissibility of the 
exhibits, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco would have had the opportunity to present argument in response to 
those concerns or to remedy the deficiency. Because there was no objection and Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco was led to believe the district court would consider the exhibits, this Court should only 
affirm the exclusion of that evidence if consideration of those documents would have been plain 
error. 
2. Any technical noncompliance with Rule 56(e)'s requirements did not effect 
trustworthiness of the documents and the district court abused its discretion 
in excluding them 
The district court concluded that the police and forensic reports did not comply with Rule 
56(e) because they were neither sworn or certified copies nor did the affidavit indicate that the 
documents were made on Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's personal knowledge. Presumably this defect 
would have been remedied if the verified petition had included an indication that the various 
attachments represented true and correct copies of the documents received by the defense from the 
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state during discovery. Such a requirement was arguably met by Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's sworn 
declaration that "I know the contents [ of the verified petition]; and attest that the matters and 
allegations contained therein are true." R. 13. With respect to the forensic fingerprint analysis, 
the amended petition provided that a "true and correct copy" report was attached as Exhibit 10. R. 
97, n.4. 
Moreover, there is no question that the documents represent true and accurate copies of 
investigative reports involved in this case. As noted by the district court, the reports attached to 
the petition were the same as those attached to the PSI, which the district court considered in 
summary judgment proceedings. R. 442, n.12. The state very well could have declined to object 
to the fact the copies were neither sworn nor certified since it recognized that the exhibits were 
accurate copies of the actual reports relevant to this case. 
The police and forensic reports attached to the verified petition were plainly accurate 
copies of those reports and the state did not object to their admissibility. To exclude the police 
and forensic reports because they were neither certified nor sworn in such circumstances is to 
exalt form over substance and an abuse of discretion. 
3. The reports set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence at an 
evidentiary hearing 
The district court also declined to consider the police and forensic reports because they 
contained inadmissible hearsay. R. 442. Initially, LC. § 19-4907, which allows a court to receive 
proof by affidavits and depositions at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, modifies the rules of 
evidence insofar as it permits the admission of certain forms of hearsay that might otherwise be 
inadmissible. Lovelandv. State, 141 Idaho 933,936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, 
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in applying Rule 56(e) in a post-conviction proceeding, affidavits must set forth "facts as would 
be admissible in evidence" at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, which may vary from whether 
the evidence would be admissible under the rules of evidence. 
Further, a police report offered into evidence by a defendant in support of his or her 
defense may be admissible under either the business records exception, I.R.E. 803(6), or the 
public records exception, I.R.E. 803(8). State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 
(Ct. App. 1996). Rule 803(8) excludes police reports except when offered by an accused in a 
criminal case. While the instant proceeding is civil in nature, the reports related to evidence that 
was admitted or would have been admissible in a criminal proceeding - a trial against Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco if he had been properly advised and not pied guilty. The forensic police report 
is followed by an affidavit which lays a foundation for its admissibility as a public record. See R. 
50. The district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize the potential admissibility of the 
reports under Rule 803(6) and (8). 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to 
counsel's failure to review the state's case with him so he could intelligently determine whether to 
put the state to its burden of proof. He attached the police and fingerprint reports to illustrate the 
discovery and evidence that his attorney should have reviewed with him, including that Dave's 
trial testimony differed from his earlier statements to police. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco asserted that trial counsel frightened him into pleading guilty 
notwithstanding his continued assertion of innocence because the state's witnesses were credible. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that had he known of Dave's inconsistent statements and other 
evidence disclosed in German's trial, including the fingerprint analysis, he would not have pied 
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guilty. The police and forensic reports were admissible as non hearsay and to illustrate the 
evidence that would have been submitted in Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's trial had he not pled guilty. 
4. Conclusion 
After the state indicated it had no objection to the district court considering the police and 
forensic reports attached to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition and the district court implied it would 
consider those documents, the district court concluded they were inadmissible. The purported 
deficiencies in the exhibits - that there were neither certified nor sworn - in no way detracted 
from their authenticity and the exhibits set forth facts that would have been admissible in the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
the police and forensic reports from its consideration of whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented 
issues of material fact to support his claims. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief Because He Presented an Issue of Material Fact as to 
Whether He Was Entitled to Relief 
1. Applicable standard 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295, 92 P.3d 542,545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a 
post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the applicant's 
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P. 3d 
626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing, 
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the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 
807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 
P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
2. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of material fact as to whether he 
received effective assistance of counsel 
The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,652,946 P.2d 
71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the 
effective assistance of competent counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, , 130 S.Ct. 
14 73, 1480-81 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 795, 152 P.3d 1237, 
1243 (Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail ifhe shows that (1) 
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). As a general matter, 
this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices. State v. 
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Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply to 
counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 7 61, 7 60 P .2d at 1177; Mitchell, 
132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. Where a petitioner alleged a guilty plea was invalid due to trial 
counsel's failure to provide sufficient advice, the petitioner can obtain relief by demonstrating that 
a decision to not plead guilty would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla,_ U.S. 
at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485; Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,905,277 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel due to 
counsel's failure to fully inform Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the state's case 
against him before insisting that he plead guilty 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel's "indifferent advice" caused a manifest 
injustice upon the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea because he "would not have agreed 
to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" if counsel had provided a copy of 
translated police reports and he had been aware potential testimony of the state's key witnesses. 
R. 5. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that trial counsel did not discuss any potential defenses to 
the state's case and repeatedly informed him that the state's witnesses were credible and he would 
be found guilty following a trial. R. 70. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco attached excerpts of the testimony 
of the state's witnesses at German's trial which sets forth their motive to make false allegations in 
order to avoid paying the drug debt, their heavy methamphetamine use and Dave's opportunities 
to escape. R. 5-10. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's fingerprints were not on the gun found underneath his 
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seat. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court noted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was advised of 
the constitutional rights he waived during the change of plea hearing and that the trial transcripts 
and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's statements during the change of plea hearing described a factual basis 
for second-degree kidnaping. However, the longstanding test for determining the validity of a 
guilty plea in the context of a ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the plea represents 
a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,905,277 P.3d 1050, 
1057 (Ct. App. 2012). The inquiry involving counsel's advice to plead guilty often turns upon the 
likelihood that discovery of an overlooked defense or exculpatory evidence would have led 
counsel to change his or her recommendation as to the plea or changed counsel's prediction as to 
the outcome of a trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60; Hoffman, 153 Idaho at 905,277 P.3d at 1057. A 
post-conviction petitioner can obtain relief by demonstrating that a decision to not plead guilty 
would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla,_ U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485; 
Hoffman, 153 Idaho at 905,277 P.3d at 1057. 
While it is unclear whether trial counsel was aware of the witnesses' testimony at 
German's trial, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco clearly alleged counsel failed to discuss that testimony with 
him. In either event, a reasonably competent attorney contemplating whether to advise his client 
to plead guilty pursuant to an agreement calling for a substantial prison term would discover at 
least the critical parts of the trial, either through attendance or review of the audio recording. 
Further, the trial testimony suggested heavy methamphetamine use by each of the key 
witnesses. See R. 32, 34 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 134, In. 6-22; p. 135, In. 22 - p. 136, In. 20; p. 296, In. 
18 
2 - p. 297, ln. 6). Dave and Wendy admitted that she was avoiding German due to a large drug 
debt. R. 31, 32 (Jury Tr. p. 265, ln. 16 - p. 266, ln. 10; p. 274, ln. 15 - p. 275, ln. 24). While both 
denied framing German for kidnaping to avoid that debt, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that such the witnesses held such a motive and that their testimony was not credible. 
See R. 25, 35 (Jury Tr. p. 197, ln. 21 - p. 198, ln. 6; p. 297, ln. 23 - p. 298, ln. 4). In exchange for 
Wendy's testimony, she was not charged for delivering methamphetamine. R. 35 (Jury Trial p. 
(Jury Trial Tr. p. 298, ln. 20 - p. 299, ln. 10). 
Dave admitted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not speak English and thus would not have 
been able to understand the communications between Dave and German. See R. 20, 23 (Jury Tr. 
p. 166, ln.19 - p. 167, ln. 2; p. 178, ln. 23-25). In an affidavit in support of his post-conviction 
petition, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that he had an entirely different focus that evening-
getting German's help to return to Mexico so he could assist his mother who had been critically 
injured in a car accident. R. 68-69. As testified to by Dave at German's trial, he had previously 
repaired German's vehicle. R. 20 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 166, ln. 19- p. 168, ln. 9). Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco believed German was seeking his assistance with further repairs so the vehicle could be 
driven to Arizona. R. 69. 
In short, the witness's testimony at German's trial was easily ascertainable prior to Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea and was necessary information for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to make a 
knowing and voluntary choice as to whether to plead guilty. That the evidence presented at 
German's trial supplied a factual basis for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's guilty as found by the district 
court is an entirely different inquiry from whether the state would have been able to convince a 
jury of his complicity beyond a reasonable doubt or whether it would have been rational to reject 
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the state's plea offer and take the matter to trial. 
In response to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's allegation that Dave's trial testimony differed from 
his statements to police, the district court found that Dave's statements to police were hearsay if 
admitted for their truth and thus it "only considered [them] for the limited purpose as a prior 
inconsistent statement which could only be offered" to impeach Dave. R. 447. However, the 
ability to impeach Dave was one of the pieces of information that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco indicated 
his trial counsel should have informed him about so he could intelligently decide whether to plead 
guilty. 
The district court also found that Dave's testimony was not mentioned within the portions 
of the transcript provided to the court. R. 447. The district court was incorrect. Dave's testimony 
at German's trial was attached to the initial petition and appears in the record on appeal at pages 
19-24. These excerpts include Dave's testimony that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco "got in the back seat 
behind me" whereas the police reports reflects that he told officers that he sat in the front 
passenger seat after Mr. Valadez-Pacheco got into the back seat. Compare R. 21 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 
170, In. 10-13). 
The state's evidence at German's trial and police and forensic reports establish that it 
would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to reject the state's offer and exercise his right 
to trial. He therefore presented an issue of fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to fully apprise him of the state's evidence and the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
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b. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was constructively denied counsel at the change of 
plea and sentencing hearings 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he was constructively denied legal counsel at the change 
of plea and sentencing hearings due to trial counsel's continued insistence that he admit to 
pointing the gun at Dave notwithstanding his continuing assertions of innocence. R. 98-99. Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he repeatedly informed trial counsel that he did not point the gun at 
Dave but that trial counsel nonetheless urged Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that he had no alternative but 
to falsely admit to doing so and to plead guilty. R. 69-70; 98. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco viewed trial 
counsel as a figure of authority and admitted to pointing the firearm at Dave although the 
statement was untrue. R. 70, 98-99. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco confided to the presentence investigator that Dave "says that I 
pointed at him with a firearm. But that is not true and the guns did not have my finger prints on 
them .... I am scared to go for many years to prison for a crime I didn't commit." PSI p. 4. The 
investigator did not believe him. Id. at p. 10. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco 
acquiesced to his attorney's representation that he wished to "maintain his guilty plea." However, 
the district court did not personally examine Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and the desire to stand by his 
guilty plea only suggests he did not want the district court to withdraw the plea. Many innocent 
defendants have plead guilty - not all of them pursuant to Alford pleas - in order to obtain the 
benefit of a plea bargain. In asking the district court to sentence him based on his guilty plea, Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco did not not contradict his statement to the investigator that he did not actually 
point the firearm at Dave. 
Although post-conviction petitioners are generally required to show prejudice from an 
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attorney's deficient performance, certain circumstances "are so likely to prejudice the accused that 
the cost oflitigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007) citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,658 (1984). The 
Cronic standard applies in the following circumstances: (1) where there is a complete denial of 
counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case 
to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) where, "although counsel is available to assist the 
accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 
659; Workman, 144 Idaho at 525-26, 164 P.3d at 805-06. The second circumstance is at issue 
here. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's assertion that 
he did not point a gun at Dave was "inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record." R. 454. 
At summary dismissal, the applicant's allegations must be accepted as true unless conclusory or 
clearly disproved by the record. Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803; Kuehl v. State, 145 
Idaho 607, 610, 181 P.3d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Unlike some cases where petitioners allege that their sworn statements at a change of plea 
hearing are false for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained 
that his guilty plea was false prior to sentencing. Then, rather than examine Mr. Valadez-Pacheco 
regarding the inconsistency, the district court accepted counsel's representation that Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco wished to stand by his guilty plea. As explained above, desiring the court to accept the 
plea is entirely different than refuting his claim of innocence. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco informed trial 
counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea but his wishes were disregarded and he 
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acquiesced to trial counsel's contrary representation. R. 98. 
Thus, the record of the criminal proceedings itself is inconsistent and Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco's claim of innocence is not "clearly disproved by the record." There exists an issue of 
material fact as to whether trial counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Further, as discussed above, the state's evidence against Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was relatively 
weak, especially considering the credibility problems of the witnesses, and it would have been 
rational for him to take the case to trial. Thus, even if counsel's performance was not sufficiently 
egregious to warrant application of the Cronic standard, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco has presented an 
issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial counsel's insistence that Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco admit to pointing the firearm at Dave notwithstanding his repeated protestations 
that he had not done so. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-conviction relief. 
c. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial 
counsel's failure to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that he would be 
inadmissible to the United States and subject to substantial penalty upon 
re-entry under federal law 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel did not discuss potential immigration 
consequences to his plea of second-degree kidnaping and insisted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco admit 
holding a gun to Dave although he had not actually done so. R. 92. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco further 
alleged that the kidnaping conviction rendered him inadmissible under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act because it constitutes a crime of moral turpitude 8 U.S.C. § 
8-l 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). R. 93. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that the kidnaping conviction also 
rendered him admissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(2)(B) due to a prior conviction in 
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Arizona, because the total confinement from his two convictions is greater than five. Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he would not have pled guilty and would have taken the case to trial 
if he had been aware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held: 
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close 
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or 
a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to 
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We 
conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the 
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla's 
claim. 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 
Further, preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important 
to the client than any potential jail sentence. Id. at 1483. The weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. Id. at 1482. 
Accordingly, the Court defined counsel's duty to advise clients regarding immigration 
consequences as follows: 
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is 
equally clear. 
Id. at 1483. "It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice 
about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so 'clearly satisfies the first prong of the 
Strickland analysis."' Id. at 1484, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 4 7 4 U.S. 52, 62 ( 1985) (White, J ., 
concurring in judgment). To obtain relief, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
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_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480 (2000). 
Trial counsel had a duty to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that his plea to second-degree 
kidnaping would potentially be considered a crime of moral turpitude and that a second conviction 
that resulted in a total period of confinement of more than five years would render him 
inadmissible. Given the potential defenses available to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and the credibility 
issues with the state's witnesses, it would have been rational for him to reject the state's plea offer 
had he received such advice. 
i. trial counsel had a duty to advice Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the 
potential immigration consequences to his plea 
In dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim, the district court indicated that "although the 
First Amended Petition reaches many legal conclusions about a conviction of second degree 
kidnapping [being] a crime of moral turpitude, the court is not to consider matters outside the 
personal knowledge of an affiant or conclusions of law." R. 451. However, the referenced 
portions of the petition cite to the Immigration and Nationality Act and are not the type of 
"conclusions of law" that do not create an issue of material fact. 
As cited by Mr. Valadez-Pacheco in his amended petition, any alien convicted of "a crime 
involving moral turpitude ... is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Additionally, "any 
alien convicted of 2 or more offenses ... for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 
years or more is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(B). Unlike an unsupported legal 
conclusion such as "counsel was ineffective," the foregoing establish the legal standards against 
which trial counsel's failure to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of immigration consequences is 
judged and the district court should not have disregarded them as unsupported legal conclusions. 
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Moreover, "certain categories of crimes are easily classified as involving moral turpitude, 
such as those with an element of fraud or those that involve a certain degree of "baseness or 
depravity," such as murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, abuse, or some forms of aggravated 
assault. Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513,519 (6th Cir. 2012). While the Ninth Circuit has 
recently held that simple kidnaping under California law is not categorically a crime of moral 
turpitude, immigration can conclude that a defendant's conduct meets the generic definition of 
that offense pursuant to the modified categorical approach Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 
1205, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). 
Trial counsel had an obligation to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the potential 
immigration consequences of the plea arrangement. While the immigration consequences of the 
second-degree kidnaping conviction are not as clear as the drug offense at issue in Padilla, 
kidnaping clearly risks being classified as a crime of moral turpitude and trial counsel had 
obligation to so advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco. Such advise would have enabled Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco to further discuss the possibilities with an immigration attorney and to attempt to 
minimize immigration consequences through plea negotiations. Fully advised of his options, Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco would have been armed with the information necessary to make a knowing and 
intelligent choice as to whether to accept a plea bargain or put the state to its burden of proof at 
trial. 
ii. the duty of trial counsel to advise regarding immigration 
consequences is distinct from any similar duty carried by the trial 
court 
The district court noted that the judge advised Mr. Valadez-Pacheco there could be 
immigration consequences to his plea. R. 452. Then, citing to United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 
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635 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2011), the district court concluded that neither the court nor counsel 
had a duty to advise him further, especially since his deportation is collateral to his conviction. Id. 
However, the Delgado-Ramos Court addressed the court's obligation to inform a defendant of 
immigration consequences prior to accepting a guilty plea and did not address counsel's obligation 
to provide such advice under the Sixth Amendment. The Court noted that: 
Because the defendant in Padilla raised only a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court had 
no occasion to consider the scope of a district court's obligation under Rule 11, 
whether a defendant's due process rights are violated if the court fails to inform him 
of the immigration consequences of his plea, or the continued viability of the 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the due process context. 
The Court thus concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent holding that due process does not require a 
court to inform defendants of collateral consequences prior to entering a plea survived the Padilla 
decision. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim alleges a Sixth Amendment violation based on counsel's failure 
to advise him regarding immigration consequences and Delgado-Ramos has no bearing on this case 
Further, the district court's advisory that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's plea of guilty could" result in your 
deportation, with the inability to obtain legal status or denial of an application for United States 
citizenship" [R. 64 (COP Tr. p. 12, ln. 4-9)] did not substitute effective advice from counsel regarding 
the potential immigration consequences particular to his case. 
iii. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of fact as to whether he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to advise him regarding 
immigration consequences 
The district court noted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco had been deported for a prior drug 
conviction, immigration placed a detainer on that basis prior to his kidnaping plea and he later pled 
guilty to illegal re-entry. R. 451-52. Although Mr. Valadez-Pacheco would have been deported 
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irrespective of his kidnaping plea, it remains unclear whether the kidnaping plea impacts his future 
ability to gain admission to the United States. Should he enter without permission, the kidnaping plea 
will greatly enhance his punishment if convicted ofillegal re-entry. See U.S.S.G. § 2Ll .2(b)(I)(A)(ii). 
Thus, while Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's immigration status irrespective of the kidnaping plea are relevant 
to whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to advise him regarding 
immigration consequences, they do not preclude an issue of material fact and the district court should 
have granted an evidentiary hearing. 
Trial counsel was obligated to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the potential immigration 
consequence of his guilty plea. Further, as discussed further below, there were serious credibility 
issues with the state's witnesses and particularly in light of Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's inability to 
communicate in English, reasonable doubt concerning Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's knowledge of what 
was occurring and the role he was playing. It would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to 
reject the plea bargain and take the matter to trial. There is an issue of fact as to whether Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to inform of the immigration consequences 
to his guilty plea. 
3. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea was invalid because it was not knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that his guilty plea was invalid because it was neither knowing, 
voluntary nor intelligent. R. 100, see also R. 11-12. Specifically, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained 
that each time he met with trial counsel, he informed counsel that he was factually innocent. R. 100. 
Trial counsel nevertheless failed to discuss trial strategy with Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and, instead, 
simply insisted he plead guilty because he would lose at trial and be sentenced to a lengthy period of 
28 
incarceration. R. 101. At the change of plea hearing, trial counsel insisted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco 
indicate he had pointed the gun at Dave when in fact Mr. Valadez-Pacheco had not done so. R. 92, 
98. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was raised to submit to figures of authority and he viewed trial counsel as 
a figure of authority. R. 101. Thus, despite his continued assertions of his factual innocence, Mr. 
Valadez-Pacheco pled guilty based solely upon trial counsel's insistence and faulty advice. R. 101. 
The district court analyzed Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim that his guilty plea was invalid in 
conjunction with its analysis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 453. However, 
the standard to evaluate a claim that a plea was involuntary is distinct from that applied to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 
An allegation that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary raises a constitutional 
challenge to the conviction which may be asserted in a post conviction proceeding. Mata v. State, 
124 Idaho 588, 593-94, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Ct. App. 1993). For a guilty plea to be valid, the 
entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 
manner. Workman, 144 Idaho at 527, 164 P.3d at 807; State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 
1193, 1194 (2007). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) 
whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges 
and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury 
trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 
98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). 
A plea of guilty is deemed coerced where it is improperly induced by ignorance, fear or fraud. 
State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530,537,211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 
107,110,897 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1995); Mata, 124 Idaho at 594, 861 P.2d at 1259. If an 
29 
innocent person would have felt compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances, it can 
properly be said that the plea was involuntary. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537,211 P.3d at 782; Spry, 
127 Idaho at 110-11, 897 P.2d at 1005-06. 
As noted above, the district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim that he did not 
point a gun at Dave was "inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record." R. 454. However, 
as discussed above, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that his guilty plea was false prior to sentencing 
In light of the supporting allegations explaining the pressure trial counsel exerted over Mr. Valadez-
Pacheco, his assertion of innocence is not conclusively disproved by the record. 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of fact as to whether his guilty plea was improperly 
induced by ignorance and fear. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment 
dismissing his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
·'1 
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